

# Maroula Khraiche

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## University Address

Department of Economics  
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Storrs, CT 06269  
University of Connecticut

## Contact Information

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<http://homepages.uconn.edu/~mlk04001>

## Education

**UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT**, Storrs, CT

Ph.D. candidate, Economics  
Expected Graduation: May 2010  
Dissertation title: "Essay on the economics of labor migration"

Master of Arts, Economics.  
Graduation: May 2006

**ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY**, Tempe, AZ

Bachelor of Science, Economics  
Bachelor of Science, Finance  
Graduation-Summa Cum Laude: May 2004

## Teaching Experience

### *Instructor*

Intermediate Microeconomic Theory  
International Finance  
Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory  
Principles of Microeconomics  
Principles of Macroeconomics  
Public Finance

University of Connecticut  
Fall 2009  
Fall 2008  
Fall 2007 & Spring 2009  
Summer 2007 & Summer 2008  
Summer 2009  
Spring 2007

### *Teaching Assistant*

Macroeconomics III (PhD)  
Advanced Mathematical Economics III (PhD)  
Advanced Mathematical Economics II (PhD)  
Microeconomics II (PhD)  
Essentials of Economics  
Econometrics I (Master's)  
Microeconomics I (Master's)  
Principles of Microeconomics  
Principles of Macroeconomics

University of Connecticut  
Spring 2008  
Spring 2008  
Fall 2006  
Fall 2006  
Fall 2006  
Spring 2006  
Fall 2005  
Spring 2005 & Fall 2005  
Fall 2004

### *Lab assistant*

Undergraduate Economics

Arizona State University  
Fall 2002 & Fall 2003

## Research and Work Experience

### *Research Assistant*

Connecticut Center for Economic Analysis  
Estimating the impact of tourism on the Connecticut economy

Summer 2005  
Storrs, Connecticut

### *Intern*

Arizona State Retirement System  
Data analysis, reports submission and distribution, survey tracking

Spring 2003  
Phoenix, Arizona

### **Published Paper - Non-Peer Reviewed**

Khraiche, Maroula and Flaherty, Patrick. "Fiscal Federalism (The U.S. Case)". *Clm.economia: Revista economica de Castilla - La Mancha*, ISSN 1695-9310, N. 8, 2006. p 325-354.

### **Professional Activities**

#### *Workshop*

Eighth Trento Summer School, Trento, Italy  
Intensive course in Agent-Based Finance

Summer 2007

#### *Presentations*

University of Connecticut, Brownbag Series

Spring 2008

University of Connecticut, Macro Workshop

Fall 2008

"Guest Worker Permits with Endogenous Return Migration"

University of Connecticut, Brownbag Series

Spring 2009 & Fall 2009

"Trade, Firm Structure and Migration of Talent"

### **Software**

EViews, Stata, Matlab, Visual Basic, HTML.

### **Honors and Awards**

Albert E. Waugh Scholarship for academic excellence and teaching

Spring 2007

University of Connecticut Department of Economics Graduate Assistantship

Fall 2004 - Present

University of Connecticut Department of Economics First Year Fellowship

Fall 2005

Arizona State University Undergraduate Tuition Scholarship for academic achievement

Spring 2003

Arizona Board of Regents Scholarship for outstanding academic record

Spring 2001 - Spring 2004

A member of the Golden Key International Honor Society

A member of the Beta Gamma Sigma Honor Society

Chosen as a Bank One Scholar

Spring 2004

Arizona State University Department of Economics Academic Excellence award

Spring 2004

### **References**

Christian Zimmermann (Advisor)

Associate Professor

University of Connecticut

christian.zimmermann@uconn.edu

Dharmika Dharmapala

Associate Professor

University of Illinois

dharmap@law.illinois.edu

Delia Furtado

Assistant Professor

University of Connecticut

delia.furtado@uconn.edu

### **Professional Service**

Graduate Student Senator, Department of Economics, University of Connecticut Fall 2006 - Spring 2008

## Working Papers

### “Guest Worker Permits with Endogenous Return Migration: The Host Country Perspective”

**Abstract** Laws restricting the flow of labor are sometimes seen as a way to loosen constrictive immigration policies. One such restriction is a worker permit system which limits the length of stay of foreign workers in the host country. This paper finds the optimal worker permit contract from the point of view of the host country by using a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model, calibrated with data from the U.S. and Mexico. In the model, the decision to migrate and the corresponding decision to return are endogenous and take place within families who are heterogeneous in terms of human capital. After finding a migrant’s optimal migration duration and the resulting shrinkage in wage gap and change in interest rates, the paper derives the restriction on migrants’ stay which maximizes natives’ utility. It also derives the migrant length of stay which would pass a majority vote. When migration duration is restricted, the fraction of the native population made better off has inverted U-shape when graphed against the migrants’ length of stay, the peak of which is at 8 years.

### “Trade, Firm Structure and Migration of Talent”

**Abstract** Throughout economic history there have been episodes in which the liberalization of trade has been accompanied by a positive flow of migrants. Such phenomena are notable because they contradict the basic Heckscher-Ohlin conclusion that trade and labor mobility are substitutes. Also notable is the fact that migrants to the U.S. have been largely skilled rather than unskilled. This paper links these two phenomena by pointing out the simple fact that increased trade can involve different types of firm structures and different types of goods being traded, which in turn have different effects on skilled and unskilled labor. The interaction between different frictions that impact labor movements, specifically the interaction between capital adjustment costs and trade costs, has a significant effect on the gap between the returns to labor in the South and North. Although the decrease in trade costs and increase in trade dampens labor movements, the existence of asymmetric capital adjustment costs in the North and South increases it. To show these results formally, this paper calibrates and solves a two-country, two-sector model of trade and migration, in which countries differ in skill endowments and capital adjustment costs and sectors differ in structures and capital intensities. Empirical analysis is then provided, with results supporting the main qualitative implications of the model.

### “Trade Openness and the Informal Sector In Latin America: A Cross Country Look”

**Abstract** With the advent of many trade policy reforms, studies have focused on the impact of this change on the informal sector in developing countries. Increased foreign competition could cause workers to be displaced driving them to informal work or push firms to subcontract to the informal sector where wages are lower and contracts are easily broken with no additional cost. Trade aside, the rise of a segmented labor market can also be attributed to several elements of an economy. One element is the failure of employment to keep up with an expanding labor force because of urbanization and population growth; therefore, many seek work in the informal sector. The other elements are labor market regulations and trade unions. Estimating the impact of these elements using a panel of 12 Latin American countries over 7 years, it is shown that trade and unemployment cause the informal sector to expand, as expected a priori. Labor market regulations also play a small part in decreasing the size of the informal sector. This result is in conflict with initial conjectures, however, one might hypothesize that increased labor market regulations lead to an increase in the value of a formal job, thus increasing the opportunity cost of informal employment.