Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Nicholas Shunda
Author-X-Name-First: Nicholas
Author-X-Name-Last: Shunda
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Redlands
Author-Person: psh174
Title: Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low (Enough)
Abstract:     In an auction with a buy price, a seller offers bidders the opportunity to forgo
competing in an auction by transacting immediately at a pre-specified fixed price. If a
seller has aspirations in the form of a reference price that depends upon the auction's
reserve price and buy price, she does best to keep her aspirations sufficiently low by
designing a no-reserve auction with a buy price low enough that some bidder types
would exercise it with positive probability in equilibrium. The seller is indifferent
between the auction component of her mechanism being a first- or second-price auction.
Classification-JEL: D44, D82, L86, C72
Keywords: Auction, Aspiration, Buy price, Internet, Reference-dependence
Length: 12 pages
Number: 2009-02
Note: I would like to thank Lorenzo Garbo and Johannes Moenius for helpful suggestions.
Creation-date: 200907
Price: Free
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/A2009-02.pdf
File-Format: Application/PDF
File-Function: Full text
Handle: RePEc:uct:alumni:2009-02


Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Anupam Nanda
Author-X-Name-First: Anupam
Author-X-Name-Last: Nanda
Author-Workplace-Name: Mumbai 
Author-Person: pna105
Author-Name: Katherine A. Pancak
Author-X-Name-First: Katherine A.
Author-X-Name-Last: Pancak
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Connecticut
Title: Broker Duty to Clients: Why States Mandate Minimum Service Requirements 
Abstract: Since 2004, ten U.S. states have enacted laws that mandate real estate brokers to provide real
estate consumers with a minimum level of services. The federal government and the academic
literature suggest that such state laws are a result of anti-competitive industry collusion, and serve
no consumer protection justification. This paper attempts to determine the factors that led states
to adopt minimum service requirements, despite significant federal opposition. The analytical
structure employs hazard models, using a unique set of economic and institutional attributes for
50 U.S. states from 2000 to 2007. Contrary to initial expectations based on the literature, our
results indicate that both strength of a state.s Realtor association and broker membership on real
estate licensing boards decrease, rather than increase, the likelihood of state adoption of broker
minimum service requirements. Factors that do increase the likelihood of adoption include higher
state licensing complaints and a democratically controlled state legislature.
Classification-JEL: C14, K11, L85, R21
Keywords: Minimum Services, Hazard Model
Length: 34 pages
Number: 2009-01
Note: Authors acknowledge helpful comments from John Clapp. All remaining errors are ours.
Creation-date: 200904
Price: Free
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/A2009-01.pdf
File-Format: Application/PDF
File-Function: Full text
Handle: RePEc:uct:alumni:2009-01